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There is no single best AI security platform, and any page that names one is selling something. The category splits into two layers that rarely compete for the same budget. Model-layer tools such as HiddenLayer, Prisma AIRS and Cisco AI Defense scan artifacts, inventory AI assets and simulate attacks. Runtime-layer tools such as Agentshield and Zenity decide whether a specific agent may run a specific tool right now. If you download model weights, buy the model layer first. If you consume models through commercial APIs and your agents call internal tools, the runtime layer is where your exposure actually sits.
Security teams usually arrive at this decision with a number attached and one quarter to spend it. The trap is that every vendor in both layers describes itself as an AI security platform, so the shortlist ends up containing four products that do not overlap enough to be compared. What follows is the split we would use, the current state of who owns whom, and the honest sequencing rule.
The two layers, and what each one actually catches
Start by asking what failure you are trying to prevent. The answer sorts the market for you in about a minute.
| Failure you are worried about | Layer that catches it | Representative products |
|---|---|---|
| A model file pulled from a public hub contains malicious code | Model layer | HiddenLayer, Prisma AIRS, Cisco AI Defense |
| Nobody can list how many AI services are running in the company | Model layer, discovery module | HiddenLayer, Noma Security, Pillar Security |
| An auditor wants the datasets and dependencies behind a deployed model | Model layer, bill of materials | HiddenLayer, Prisma AIRS |
| An agent reads a poisoned document and calls a tool it should never touch | Runtime layer | Agentshield, Zenity |
| An agent with a valid credential sends customer data to an external endpoint | Runtime layer | Agentshield |
| You need per-action evidence of what each agent did and on whose authority | Runtime layer | Agentshield |
The rows do not overlap, which is the point. A scanner that has cleared a model tells you nothing about whether that model's agent should be allowed to issue a refund at 2am, because permission is not a property of an artifact. Equally, no runtime policy repairs a backdoored checkpoint that is already executing inside your infrastructure. We sell the runtime layer and we still tell teams importing open weights to buy scanning first, because the alternative is watching a code execution problem from the wrong side of the stack.
Most of the model layer now belongs to a platform vendor
This is the part that ages shortlists badly. Between 2024 and 2026 the independent AI security market consolidated hard, and several names on a two-year-old analyst grid no longer sell the product described in it.
| Company | Status | What you are buying now |
|---|---|---|
| Protect AI | Acquired by Palo Alto Networks, completed July 2025, reported around 700 million dollars | Prisma AIRS, inside the Palo Alto platform |
| Robust Intelligence | Acquired by Cisco, October 2024, reported around 400 million dollars | Cisco AI Defense, inside Cisco Security Cloud |
| Lakera | Acquired by Check Point, announced September 2025, reported around 300 million dollars | Check Point AI security |
| Prompt Security | Acquired by SentinelOne, completed September 5 2025 | SentinelOne AI security |
| CalypsoAI | Acquired by F5, September 2025, reported around 145 million dollars | F5 AI security |
Aim Security went to Cato Networks and Apex went to Tenable in the same window. That is seven absorbed companies. HiddenLayer, Noma Security, Pillar Security and Zenity are among the few of any size still independent, which is worth knowing in both directions.
Acquisition is not automatically bad news. It usually means better support depth, a procurement path your organization already has, and a vendor your board recognizes. It changes four things that belong in your evaluation: the procurement route, the packaging and whether the AI capability is now an add-on to a suite you do not run, the support model, and whose engineering priorities the roadmap serves. Ask for the committed roadmap in writing for the specific features you are buying for. A startup roadmap and a business-unit roadmap inside a 100 billion dollar platform vendor are different documents.
The mirror-image risk applies to the independents. A smaller company carries your renewal, and the base rate in this market says it may be acquired during your contract term. Neither risk is disqualifying. Both belong in the file.
How to pick inside the model layer
If artifact risk is your problem, the shortlist is short. HiddenLayer is the strongest remaining independent and its scanning reads inside model files for malicious code, embedded CVEs and tampered layer structure, generating a bill of materials for each scanned model. Prisma AIRS carries the former Protect AI technology and is the natural pick if you already run Palo Alto. Cisco AI Defense is the same logic for a Cisco estate. Noma Security and Pillar Security compete on lifecycle posture and both publish credible original research.
Three questions separate them faster than any feature matrix. Which model formats and registries does it actually scan in your pipeline, tested against your own artifacts rather than a demo repo. Does the bill of materials export in a format your GRC team can consume, or does it produce a report someone has to retype. And does it run as a gate in CI that can fail a build, or only as a report that someone reads later. The third question is the one that separates a control from a dashboard.
We compare each of these honestly, including where they beat us, on HiddenLayer alternatives, Prisma AIRS and Robust Intelligence.
How to pick inside the runtime layer
Runtime is a younger market and the vendor claims are noisier, so test the claims rather than reading them. The question that matters is whether the product can refuse an action, or only report on one after it happened. Both are legitimate products. They are not the same purchase, and the demo will not distinguish them unless you ask directly.
A short evaluation that exposes the difference: give the agent a document containing an injected instruction to call a tool outside its permitted set, and watch what happens. A detection product raises an alert and the tool call completes. An enforcement product refuses the call and records the refusal. Then ask to see the evidence trail for that single action, and check whether it names the agent, the tool, the credential, the data touched and the authority the action ran under. If the trail is a log line, it will not survive an audit.
Two more things worth insisting on. Approval gates should be configurable per tool rather than per agent, because the risk lives in the action, not in the identity. And the enforcement point should sit outside the agent framework, so a change of framework does not void your controls. Teams running LangChain, the OpenAI Agents SDK and a coding agent simultaneously discover this the hard way. The mechanics are on tool permissions and human in the loop AI agents.
The sequencing rule, stated plainly
If you download or fine-tune open model weights, buy the model layer first. A compromised artifact is arbitrary code execution inside your infrastructure and no runtime policy repairs it.
If you consume models entirely through commercial APIs from OpenAI, Anthropic or Google, the artifact supply chain risk is largely carried by the provider. Your concentrated exposure is what your agents do with tools and data, so buy the runtime layer first.
If you do both, which describes most enterprises above a few hundred people, buy the model layer first and the runtime layer within the same fiscal year. The ordering is about which failure is unrecoverable, not which is more likely.
One adjacent obligation catches teams out at exactly this point. Once agents start reading and writing customer records, the next request is rarely a security one. It is a privacy team asking where a specific person's data ended up, and answering that means being able to trace where an individual's records live across every connected system rather than reconstructing it from logs after the fact. Worth scoping before the first subject request arrives, not after.
What to put in the evaluation document
Whichever layer you start with, these five lines do more work than a scored matrix, because each one has a verifiable answer.
- Which specific failure from the table above are we buying to prevent, named in one sentence.
- Does the product gate, or does it report. If it gates, what happens when it is wrong.
- Who owns the vendor today, and what is the committed roadmap in writing for the features we are buying for.
- What does the evidence output look like for one incident, shown against our data rather than a demo tenant.
- What does it cost at three times our current agent or model volume, since that is next year.
If a vendor cannot answer the second and fourth questions in a first call, that is information. The AI security market is young enough that a fair number of platforms are still assembling the product they are describing, and the fastest way to find out is to ask what happens on a specific action rather than what the platform covers in general.
If your exposure is the runtime half, you can see the enforcement decision on a live tool call in the console at the top of this page, or read the full comparison on HiddenLayer alternatives and AI agent access control.
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